3 Democrat manifesto too. 11 As a result, foreign policy was not a big source of disagreement during the negotiations that led to the agreement to form the coalition government on 20 May 2010. 12 Where there was discord, such as over Britain's future role in the European Union (EU) policy or the renewal of the nuclear missiles, 'they were postponed by simply making firm commitments -but not yet; and cast forward into a future parliament'. 13 Cameron in fact had more to worry about from his own Eurosceptic backbenchers than the Liberal Democrats, 14 although it was evidently a testing part of the coalition negotiations in 2010. 15 Cameron and Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg did not want to sacrifice coalition cohesion at the altar of partisan spats in foreign affairs.
To investigate the foreign policy practices undertaken on the back of the liberal Conservative reading of international relations, the article begins by explaining the discourse approach taken to the data. The second part analyses how the coalition government thought about Britain's identity and its accompanying role in a globalized world. The third part outlines how liberal Conservatism construed the interplay between values and interests in British foreign policy to inform a series of foreign policy practices that drew strong conceptual connections between aid, development and security. The key claim made below agrees with Rhiannon Vickers's view that 'it is possible to discern an overall foreign policy approach of liberal Conservatism that was liberal enough to satisfy the Conservatives'
Coalition partners, while rejecting the more idealistic tenets of new Labour's foreign policy.' 16 The distinctive threads of this approach were, firstly, its concentration on the economics of foreign policy; second, its use of all the tools of 'soft power' at Britain's disposal to attain a 'great' power role; and, finally, its recognition of the stricter limits on Britain's capacity to exert ideational entrepreneurship in an era of declining resources, rising powers, new security challenges and the decline of American hegemony.
Interpreting liberal Conservatism

4
This article explores liberal Conservatism using qualitative discourse analysis of primary sources, to demonstrate how the resulting foreign policy practices gave meaning to those beliefs. The central aim of a discourse approach is 'to understand how specific human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds'. 17 Discourse analysis identifies the textual markers and conceptual hooks on which discourse producers hang their webs of belief about the nature of 'reality', 18 treating, in this case, foreign policy decision-makers as situated agents (see the introduction to this Special Issue) operating in embedded institutional and social contexts. Three preparatory remarks are in order to scope the analysis that follows.
The first is that secrecy and access issues seriously affect the study of foreign policy, especially in relatively 'closed' foreign policy-making environs such as in Britain. Semistructured elite interviews were conducted with individuals very close to the events in question. However, the interviewees, many of them still active in public life, did not give permission to be cited in this article. The use of public pronouncements and official documents is a pragmatic riposte to the practical limitations on researching the dynamics of foreign policy activity. Second, the discourse data was drawn from speeches by the key This is not to deny that the Liberal Democrats left many significant imprints on the governance of Britain, for example, by helping safeguard civil liberties in the enactment of anti-terror legislation, 19 and by keeping up pressure on the government to commit future governments to spending 0.7% of national income on aid, 20 which bore fruit in the International Development Act of March 2015. 21 However, the Liberal Democrats possessed 'junior status in the coalition', 22 and it is noteworthy that in terms of individuals involved in the foreign policy decision-making process there was clear Conservative domination at departmental level, notably the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department 5 for International Development (DfID), and the newly created body for coordinating national security, the National Security Council (NSC). 23 Third, the discourse method is informed by work on the constructed nature of Britain's world role, 24 and the part played by the study of discourse in understanding the dynamics behind identity creation, role promotion and external action on the part of states. 25 Crucially, this body of work points to a direct connection between national identity and foreign policy practices. 26 As Jamie Gaskarth has written:
'Having a strong self-identity and sense of Britishness is seen as important to British foreign policymakers, both in mobilizing support for governmental actions abroad, and to give those actions meaning'.
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The discourse analysis below is themed around two sets of questions. This was very much a New Labour foreign policy tradition too; 32 Cameron and Hague both subscribed to the list, 33 as later did Philip Hammond. 34 This list of British qualities was also deployed to explain the thinking behind policies contained in key policy documents such as the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). 35 What were these British qualities and resources?
First of all, liberal Conservatism flagged up a series of material coercive capabilities, with special reverence for 'the hard power of our military' and the nation's 'brilliant armed forces'. 36 Second, Britain could call on an impressive roll call of diplomatic ties, partly but not exclusively a legacy of its imperial past: 'We sit at the heart of the world's most powerful institutions, from the G8 and the G20, to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the Commonwealth, and the UN Security Council'. 37 Hammond certainly felt that Britain's embeddedness in all the relevant regional and international orgnisations ties meant 'Britain remains one of the few countries in the world that can set the global foreign policy agenda', its multilateral ties helping it deal with thorny dilemmas such as Russian revanchism in the Ukraine. 38 Third, Britain was also said to be 'a great economic power' and a 'great trading force in the world'. 39 It was home to 'one of the most open economies on earth' centring on the City of London which helped 'power the world economy'. 40 The launch of the 'Britain is GREAT' global promotional campaign, launched in 2012 to coincide with the Queen's and both his Foreign Secretaries believed that external relations and economic policy were mutually constitutive: 'our foreign policy must also support our long-term economic plan'. On a day to day basis this agenda was enacted through the Diplomatic Excellence
Initiative for the FCO. Launched in December 2010, 46 and publicized by Hague in a September 2011 speech, the objectives were: to expand Britain's diplomatic network; to improve the institution's skills and organisational memory; and to put its budget on a surer footing by decoupling it from the fluctuating value of sterling in the global currency markets. 47 FCO diplomats were encouraged to be more than 'political ambassadors' -why not be 'economic ambassadors too'? Because in a 'global race for jobs' every new market needed exploiting, feeding what Cameron called a 'modern industrial strategy'. 48 Being 'smarter' about making and executing foreign policy overlapped with being 'smarter' about national security: 'we also have to be more strategic and hard headed about how we go about advancing our national interests', particularly in terms of matching commitments to resources in defence terms. 49 The creation of the NSC, the contents of the NSS and the accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review were all driven by the need to 'ensure that ministers consider national security in the round and in a strategic way'.
50
These beliefs about Britain's material assets and advantages were used to support the characteristically Conservative emphasis on nationhood, embodied in the opinion that, despite confronting a series of interlocking domestic and international crises, Britain could still be 8 seen to be 'walking tall abroad' 51 by allying its material capabilities to 'soft power' capabilities. 52 As Philip Hammond recalled of the thought processes in 2010, 'we understood from the outset that the world would not stand still while we picked ourselves up and addressed our weaknesses' on the resource side. 53 Not for liberal Conservatives pulling up 'the drawbridge' to the outside world, 54 being 'on the defensive', 55 succumbing to 'strategic shrinkage' (a key liberal Conservative headline), 56 or accepting a strategy 'set to decline'. 57 The NSS affirmed the collective view: 'We are a country whose political, economic and cultural authority far exceeds its size'. 58 Britain's 'soft power' capabilities were said to span a number of cultural dimensions, 59 which, as recognised by commentators such as Christopher
Hill and Sarah Beadle, could be mobilized 'to influence the behaviour of others and obtain desired outcomes through attraction and co-option'. 60 To begin, the English language 'one of the great languages of humanity', 61 and 'the global language of business', 62 which gained added influence through institutions such as the BBC. 63 Next, the 'intercontinental reach of our time zone', 64 whereby 'you can trade with Asia in the morning and America in the afternoon'. 65 Britain further benefitted from its 'world-class universities', 66 and a 'pioneering, buccaneering spirit', 67 that introduced to the world 'the modern computer and the World Wide Web'. 68 Then there were the wider benefits from the 'cultural impact' of such institutions as the British Council and the heritage industry around 'our great museums'. 69 Finally, there was the 'unrivalled history of democratic, legal and political development' inculcated in the British system of government, 70 much exported, and incorporating 'a civil service and a diplomatic service which are admired over the world for their professionalism and their impartiality'. 71 Conservative eulogies to the qualities of the British nation were prominent in informing coalition foreign policy practices, and having reviewed these we now consider the kind of world in which liberal Conservatives saw Britain expressing its agency. 78 Soft threats in this depiction clearly had the potential to augment hard threats such as violent extremist terrorism and Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Liberal Conservatism also posited that 'failed states' were not containable within sovereign borders but their problems would leak out to affect the international community as a whole.
Cameron used the example of Somalia in 2011: 'a failed state that directly threatens British interests' defined in terms of: civilians (kidnappings of tourists and aid workers), trade (routes being disrupted by piracy), migration, and ideology ('minds poisoned by radicalism'). 79 Meanwhile, instability in countries such as Libya 'underlined the need for us to reshape our armed forces as rapidly as possible' because it flagged the need for 'a different kind of military to meet different kinds of threat'. 80 Drawing this section to a close, it can be seen that liberal Conservatives saw the goal of national foreign policy practices as being to enhance both the prosperity and the security of a community of people possessing a relatively cohesive set of 'cultural' properties 'deep in their DNA' This gave rise to a series of reflections on both the upsides and downsides of being a formerly major power operating in an interdependent global arena. Accepting
Britain's reduced place in the 'hierarchy of nations', 81 liberal Conservatism nonetheless suggested that Britain need not settle for second class status, even in an age of domestic austerity. The role liberal Conservatism identified for Britain was thus of a 'great' power of a different kind, using all the skills and qualities provided by its soft power assets. How this identity and role construction fed particular liberal Conservative foreign practices will be amplified in the next section through a discussion of liberal Conservative discourse on
promoting British values and interests through its foreign policy.
British interests and values
The previous section illustrated the key ways in which liberal Conservativism focussed on the economics of foreign policy and the plethora of 'soft power' capabilities that could help Britain achieve its external goals by persuasion and ideational attraction rather than via the blunt exercise of coercive power. This section will suggest that this exercise in rebranding 'It will focus like a laser on defending and advancing Britain's national interest'. 83 In 2011
Cameron spoke of 'focussing our foreign policy on one objective: promoting Britain's national interest'. 84 In 2012 Cameron described it as 'standing up for our interests in the world'. 85 This much was to be expected, so of greater import here is the answer to research question 2a, How did liberal Conservatism define the British national interest? On the one hand, Cameron suggested 'our national interest is easily defined. It is to ensure our future prosperity and to keep our country safe in the years ahead'. 86 The national interest was rooted in economic and territorial security; in the former realm, especially, it was about 'making sure British interests get heard'. 87 On the other hand, the Prime Minister argued 'our national interests are affected more than ever by events well beyond our shores' and that is the reason 'why we need to maintain a global foreign policy'. 88 The interplay between British and international interests drew on the idea (considered above) that for liberal Conservatives the global political economy was characterized by complex interdependence in which even sizeable powers such as Britain had to react to events using flexible policy instruments drawing on all available sources of hard and soft power. which by September 2013 had been endorsed by two-thirds of the international community. 96 One outcome was that by the end of 2014 work was being undertaken by the UK and Canada on a joint mission to support the survivors of sexual rape and slavery allegedly perpetrated by ISIL in Iraq. 97 As Jamie Gaskarth has argued, this example of an 'activist' foreign policy on 13 the part of Britain shows that it is easier for policy entrepreneurs to build consensus behind policies that have relatively little impact on the vital national interests of other states (particularly those influential in bodies such as the P-5 of the UN), and where policies will directly benefit the lives of weaker members of society, enabling coalitions of the willing to be built behind targeted measures. It is also attractive when the policies do not pose a potential risk to the lives of British service personnel or civilian volunteers. 101 In 2012 Cameron said he remained committed to its 'promises to the poorest' with a view to 'eradicating absolute poverty in our world'. 102 The first version of the FCO business plan for 2011-15, published in November 2010, explicitly linked the UK's promotion of human rights to its application of soft power globally. 103 Good illustrations of how the coalition tried to enact a foreign policy 'that simultaneously served UK interests, whilst providing a net benefit to vulnerable non-citizens' was in its approach to the stabilisation of 'fragile' states and the arms trade. Both are well covered by Gilmore, 104 so a few remarks about the beliefs underpinning state stabilisation will suffice to clarify the connections between discourse and practice. Responsibility for state stabilisation (lately during the Ebola crisis) has fallen on the civil-military Stabilisation Unit in the FCO, its funding governed by the NSC and thus with strong executive control from the around state stabilisation were illustrated by Cameron using the example of Pakistan. That by 2011 Pakistan was 'set to become the biggest recipient of British aid' was, said Cameron, not charity for charity's sake: 'Terrorism feeds on broken countries, so our response must go far beyond tackling the leadership of terrorist groups'. 106 Aid in liberal Conservative discourse was an instrument of security alongside 'hard' military prowess, while the NSS represented state stabilisation as a means of addressing the threat to the UK from failed or failing states. 107 Cameron fully subscribed to 'the moral argument for aid' because 'we have obligations to the poorest in the world'. Nonetheless, 'I also believe it is in our national interest. Isn't it better to help stop countries disintegrating -rather than end up dealing with the consequences for our own country: immigration, asylum terrorism?'. 108 Two years earlier Hague had spelt out the economic -and therefore the interest -case for aid to developing countries even more clearly:
'We will be conscious that relatively small sums of money spent on conflict prevention can avert the need to spend vast sums on intervention or reconstruction aid, and is in alignment with our moral as well as national security duties'. 109 In the liberal Conservative view, Britain -and the world -needed 'to change the way we do development' because targeted aid can 'help avoid crises before they explode into violence, requiring immense military spending'. 110 Conveniently, 'aid…can also contribute to a positive impression of Britain'. 
